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Prospects for a "World (Internal) Law?": Legal
Developments in a Changing International
System
JOST DELBROCK*

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, international law was conceived of as exclusively inter-state
law. However, in the course of the late Nineteenth and the Twentieth
Centuries, other subjects of international law emerged. Thus, international
intergovernmental organizations were gradually recognized as international
legal entities endowed with a limited legal capacity to act under international
law. In addition, individuals also gained international legal status in the course
of the development of the international protection of human rights, particularly
after World War II. It is a common characteristic of these new subjects of
international law that they derive their (limited) international legal status from
legal enactments by states as the original members of the international legal
community.
Therefore, although the international intergovernmental
organizations, foremost the United Nations Organization (UNO), came to play
an increasingly important role in the international system, the recognition of
new subjects of international law did not lead to a reconsideration of the
understanding of international law as a principally inter-state legal order.
Today, due especially to the impact of globalization-understood as a
process of denationalization of markets, politics, and law on the international as
well as the national levels-it is no longer true that international law is an
exclusively inter-state legal order.' Its state-centeredness is giving way to a
broader understanding of the scope and reach of international legal principles
* Professor Emeritus Dr. habil., LL.M. (Indiana University), Retired Director of the Walther-Schlncking
Institute of International Law at the University of Kiel, Germany, Professor of Law, Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington. E-mail: jdelbrueck@web.de.
1. For the definition of globalization as a process or a set of processes of denationalization, see Jost
DelbrIck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implicationsfor Domestic Law-A European
Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993) [hereinafter Delbrflck, GlobalizationofLaw];
Jost Delbrilck, StructuralChanges in the InternationalSystem andIts Legal Order: InternationalLaw in the
Era of Globalization, 1 Swiss REV. OF INT'L & EUR. L. [SRIEL] 1, 13-17 (2001) [hereinafter Delbralck,
StructuralChanges].
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and norms now extending to various new actors in the international system. In
short, international law is in the process of transforming, at least partially, into a
World Law or World "Internal" Law extending to states, governmental and
non-governmental organizations, and other non-state corporate entities, as well
as groups and individuals. This paper will begin with a closer analysis of the
concepts of "World Law" and "World Politics" (Part I), followed by a short
summary of the stages of development of the international system (Part II). It
will then address, in some detail, the development of international law under
the impact of globalization (Part III), and will conclude with some tentative
remarks on the potential structure of a new World Law (Part IV).
I. THE CONCEPTS OF WORLD LAW AND WORLD POLITICS
The concept "World Law" ("Weltinnenrecht") was introduced as an
analogy to the concept "World Politics" ("Weltinnenpolitik"). 2 Both concepts
have a nice political appeal but are quite problematic. They appear logically to
require the pre-existence of an organized entity (for instance, a World State)
within which such politics and law can be developed and implemented. This is
what C.F. v. Weizsdcker-and other authors following him-intended the
concept "World Politics" to mean.3 It is banal to observe that such a World
State or superior Authority does not exist and that it is not even desirable.4 On
2. The term "World Internal Law" is a literal translation of the German term "Weltinnenrecht," which in
turn is a term coined as an analog to the term "Weltinnenpolitik" (World Internal Politics) first used by the
German philosopher C.F. von Weizsacker during the height of the Cold War in the late 1960s. He opined that
World Peace could only be achieved by establishing a central World Authority and by radically curtailing state
sovereignty.
Traditional state-centered international politics needed to be transformed into a
"Weltinnenpolitik" (World Internal or "Domestic" Politics) replacing traditional power politics. The term
"Weltinnenrecht" (World Internal Law) is meant to signify an analogous transformation of the traditional state
centered notion of international (inter-state) law. Since these German notions do not easily translate into
English, the terms World Law (as distinguished from the traditional term "international law") and World
Politics will be used in this article; the term "World Law" in the sense described was already used by the
author in an earlier piece. Jost Delbruick, A More Effective InternationalLaw or a New "World Law "?Some Aspects of the Development of InternationalLaw in a ChangingInternationalSystem, 68 IND. L. J. 705
(1993). Recently, the concept of "World Community Law" has been introduced by Professor Nettesheim as
the English equivalent of "Weltinnenrecht" or "Weltgemeinschaftsrecht."
3. See C.F. v. Weizsicker, Das ethische Problem der modernen Strategie [The Ethical Problem of
Modern Strategy] EUROPA-ARCHIV 191 (1969).
4. See Jost Delbraick, "Das Volkerrecht soll aufeinen FdderalismfreierStaaten gegriindetsein"-Kant
und die Entwicklung internationalerOrganisation[InternationalLaw Shall Be Foundedon a Federalismof
Free States-Kant and the Development of International Organisation], in REPUBLIK UND
WELTBORGERRECHT [REPUBLIC AND WORLD CITIZENSHIP] 181,203 (Klaus Dicke & Klaus-Michael Kodalle
(Hrsg.) eds., 1998).
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a closer look, however, it becomes clear that this seemingly logical connection
between the concepts of World Law and World Politics and a pre-existing
organized superior entity is not a necessary one. The alleged logical connection
rests on an unwarranted state-centered perception of the notion of politics and
law. Neither the determination and pursuance of politics nor the enactment and
enforcement of law presuppose the existence of a superior state or a state-like
entity as is evidenced by the existence of a rather loose-knit international legal
community, or-in political science terms-the international or regional
communities of states.5 Both concepts-World Law and World Politics--can
legitimately be applied to the meta-state level. Consequently, World Law may
be defined as a body of law that transcends the notion of strictly inter-state law
but does not exclude it; that is World Law encompasses in its scope and
application state and non-state actors, transactions and situations of most
different kinds beyond the state or national level. Thus, World Law, if it really
exists, constitutes a body of law that is the result of a partial transformation of
the traditional inter-state law, i.e. public international law, complemented by
further legal components. In turn, the concept of World Politics denotes the
political transactions of states and the different non-state actors in the global
realm beyond the national level in pursuit of-ideally-the common interests of
humankind.
II. OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM AND THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON ITS STRUCTURE

It is a questionable undertaking to divide historic developments into distinct
phases or periods, because the specific characteristics of a given period do not
appear abruptly but rather emerge over a longer time span. These fully unfold
and later become overlaid by new developments and are ultimately replaced by
the latter. Despite these methodological reservations, however, it is safe to
distinguish roughly three major stages in the development of the international
system: first, the so-called classical period that is-particularly by the AngloAmerican literature-often referred to as the "Westphalian System," beginning
with the conclusion of the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648; second, the

5. For an in-depth discussion of whether or not the concepts of World Politics and World Law can be used
on the meta-state level, see L. MEYER-BRUNS, WELTINNENPOLITIK-STAATLICHE SOUVERANITAT INDER
INTERNATIONALEN GEMEINSCHAFT [WORLD POLITICS-STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY] (1998).
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period of the international organization of the community of states6 that dates
from the late Nineteenth Century and fully unfolds during the Twentieth
Century; and third, the present period of globalization. With respect to each of
these periods the phenomenon of overlapping developments in the international
system is quite apparent: the classical period emerges some time before 1648
with the gradual formation of the modem territorial state. The period of the
international organization of the community of states takes shape in the second
half of the Nineteenth Century and replaces the classical system after World
War I. Presently, we can observe the gradual overlaying of the international
organization of states by the phenomenon of globalization.7
A. The ClassicalInternationalSystem
With regard to its actors, the classical international system was quite
homogeneous. It was exclusively dominated by the sovereign territorial or
nation states, and even the Holy See-today a non-territorial special subject of
international law-conformed to the prevailing notion of a territorial state entity
during the classical period. Sovereignty was the leading paradigm and
pervasive legal principle in the international system of the classical period.
States perceived themselves as clearly delimited independent legal subjects
The most conspicuous expression of
committed to self-preservation.
ad
bellum,
the sovereign right of states freely to
sovereignty was the liberum ius
go to war. International customary law as the legal order of the classical
international system contained only a few substantive principles and norms.
Aside from customary law, international law was mainly constituted by bilateral
treaties. Moreover, even seemingly multilateral treaties were understood by
legal doctrine as sets of bilateral treaty relations-a clear indication of the
dominance of the principle of sovereignty that requires state consent to any
legal obligation incurred. To conceive of multilateral treaties as a surrogate for
the absent central lawmaking authority was as alien a notion for the sovereign
states as the concept of an international central law enforcement authority.
The classical international system transcended itself in a curious dialectical
process. Because of socio-political changes and technological breakthroughs
6. WALTHER SCHUCKiNG, DIE ORGANISATION DER WELT (1909) is a groundbreaking book by Walther
Schacking that describes the fundamental change in the structure of the international system that characterizes
the second stage of its development.
7. See WILHELM GEORG GREwE, EPOCHEN DER VOLKERRECHTSGESCHICHTEpassim (1984); see also
DelbrtIck, Structural Changes, supra note 1, at 6.
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(means of transportation by land and sea, industrial production of goods,
revolutionary advances in weapons technology), demands on the domestic
resources that were indispensable for the self-preservation of the sovereign
territorial state increased to a degree that transcended the capacities of even the
largest states. The response to these needs was found, on the one hand, in
colonial expansion, and on the other-particularly relevant in the present
context-in inter-state cooperation for the mutual provision of the needed
resources. The result was an increasing interdependenceof states. Thus, selfpreservation as the ultimate raison d'9tat led sovereign states to follow a
strategy that promoted the limitation and even the partial destruction of the very
foundation of self-preservation, i.e. national independence, and created
interdependence instead. In other words, a change of paradigm in the
international system and its legal order was initiated. The transition of the
international system to that of the institutional organization of states gained
momentum.
B. The InternationalSystem in the Era of InternationalOrganizationof the
Community of States
Self-preservation of the sovereign states required inter-state cooperation as
a complementary strategy of safeguarding domestic welfare and national
security. This cooperation, in turn, necessitated inter-state relations that were
more permanent and reliable than those the traditional bilateral treaty relations
could provide. Consequently, in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, one
could already observe a trend toward institutionalized cooperation founded on
multilateral treaties. Examples are the so-called Administrative Unions like the
International Telegraphic Union (1865-still active today as the International
Telecommunications Union) and the Universal Postal Union (1874-still active
under the same name today). This movement toward institutionalized
cooperation culminated in the founding of the League of Nations in 1919. The
"philosophy" of this organization was modeled along the lines of Kant's
"Federalism of the Free States" and other older and contemporary proposals for
the organization of states.8
8. See KURT v. RAUMER, EWIGER FRIEDE. FRIEDENSRUFE UND FRIEDENSPLANE SErr DER RENAISSANCE
[CALLS FOR PEACE AND PEACE PLANS SINCE THE RENNAISSANCE PERIOD] (1953); KARL JOSEPH PARTSCH,
DIE IDEEN WALTHER SCHOCKINGS ZUR FRIEDENSSICHERUNG [WALTHER SCHOCKING'S IDEAS FOR THE
MAINTENANCE OF PEACE] (Walther-Schficking-Kolleg, No. 3, 1985); FRANK BODENDIEK, WALTHER
SCHOCKINGS KONZEPTION DER INTERNTIONALEN ORDNUNG-DOGMATISCHE STRUKTUREN UND
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From a political science perspective, the foundation of international
organizations constituted a change of the structure of the international system.
The types of actors participating in the transactions in the international system
became more diversified. However, the debate between the realist and neorealist school and the protagonists of the theory of integration and related
schools of thought continues today. The question is whether these new actors
are-at least to some degree-independent actors or whether they are simply
instruments used by powerful states to promote their national interests. 9
International law also had doctrinal difficulties in coming to grips with
international organizations as new actors in the international system. It took
almost fifty years until the reality of the era of international organizations was
finally recognized by international law, and international legal personality was
attributed to international organizations.' 0 However, from an international law
perspective the importance of the international organization of the community
of states is not restricted to the recognition of international organizations as
limited and derivative subjects of international law. In the present context, the
impact of the institutionalization of inter-state cooperation on the status and role

of the sovereign states is of equal relevance. Already in the early administrative
unions, in which membership-according to the self-perception of the Member
States-did not infringe upon their sovereign status," such membership
[WALTHER SCHOCKING'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE
IDEENGESCHICHTLICHE BEDEUTUNG
INTERNATIONAL ORDER-DOCTRNAL STRUCTURES AND ITS PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS] (2001);

Delbrilck, supra note 4.
9. For the realists' position, see generally HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1948); Hans J. Morgenthau, PoliticalLimitations ofthe UnitedNations,
in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 143, 150 (George A. Lipsky ed., 1953) (There is no such
thing as the policy of an organization, international or domestic, apart from the policy of its most influential
member or members."). See also WERNER LINK, DIE NEUORDNUNG DER WELTPOLITIC: GRUNDPROBLEME
GLOBALER POLITIK AN DER SCHWELLE ZUM 21. JAHRHUNDERT [ESTABLISHING ANEW WORLD ORDER:
BASIC PROBLEMS OF GLOBAL POLITICS AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21 ST CENTURY] 108, 114 (1998). For a
critique of the realist stance, see KLAUS DICKE, EFFIZIENZ UND EFFEKTIVITAT INTERNATIONALER
ORGANISATIONEN. DARSTELLUNG UND KRITISCHE ANALYSE ENES ToPoS IM REFORMPROZEB DER
VEREINTEN NATIONEN [EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. DESCRIPTION
AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ATOPOS INTHE PROCESS OF UNITED NATIONS REFORM] 340 (1994); Volker
Rittberger, InternationalOrganizations-Theoryof, in UNITED NATIONS-LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE
(Rtldiger Wolfrum ed., 1995) 760, 763.
10. See LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 18 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir
Arthur Watts eds., 1996).
11. State members remained the "masters of the founding treaties" of the international organizations. It is
interesting to note that the German Constitutional Court in in its Maastrichtdecision of 1993 had recourse to
this notion. Arguing that with increased powers of the European Community/Union provided by the
Maastricht Treaty the Federal Republic ofGermany did not suffer restrictions of its sovereignty that would be
incompatible with the provisions of the German Constitution, the Basic Law. The Court observed that the
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resulted in a de facto limitation on the sovereign freedom of action of the
members. Although from a strictly legal point of view they may have remained
the masters over the constituent treaties of these organizations and their
membership, in fact, their sovereign freedom of action could only be preserved
by leaving the organization. This, in turn, would mean that the departing
member would lose the very benefits of cooperation for which the respective
state had joined the organization in the first place. However, membership in an
international organization meant, and still means today, a considerable
limitation on the sovereignty of the Member States in legal terms as well.
Depending on the scope of the mandate of an international organization and its
competences, such limitation of the members' sovereignty in some cases could
even extend to the obligation to submit to majority decisions. Finally, the
monopolist status of the sovereign states in the international system was also
relativized by the fact that territorial non-state entities were accorded full
membership in some international organizations alongside with state members
(for instance, then-colonial India and Canada were accepted as full members in
the Universal Postal Union).12
This process of increasing limitations on state sovereignty and of the
institutionalization of interstate cooperation culminated in the foundation of the
United Nations and the rapidly growing number of various international and
regional fora for the coordination of cooperative policies. Observing these
developments in the 1960s, Wolfgang Friedmann was inspired to speak of the
"changing structures of international law" and of the transformation of
international law from a mere "law of coexistence" into an "international law of
3
cooperation."

state members of the EC/EU still remained the "masters of the Treaty" and could end their membership
unilaterally. See BVerfGE 89, 155 (190, 198). However, the truth is that under the present international law
of treaties such "unilateral" withdrawal is not permissible unless provided in the treaty, which is not the case
with the EC/EU Treaties. For a critical review of the Maastricht decision, see STEPHAN HOBE, DER OFFENE
VERFASSUNGSSTAAT ZWISCHEN SOUVERANITAT UND INTERDEPENDENZ [THE OPEN REPUBLIC BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERDEPENDENCE] 354 (1997).

12. See Delbrck, Structural Changes, supra note 1, at 8.
13. See WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60 (1964); see
also Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 142 (Richard Falk et al. eds., 1985); Jost Delbralck, The Impact of the
Allocation of InternationalLaw Enforcement Authority on the International Legal Order, in ALLOCATION OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM OF THE KIEL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MARCH 23 TO 25, 1994, 135, 137 (Jost

Delbr0ck & Ursula E.Heinz eds., 1994).
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Indeed, with regard to the second phase of the development of the
international legal order, one can speak of a change of paradigm: The classical
international law that was dominated by the paradigm of sovereignty
transformed into an international law that is predominantly informed by the
new paradigm of peace. This new international law can rightly be called-at
least ideally-an "international law of cooperation," notwithstanding all
setbacks and lapses into past patterns by some great as well as some smaller
powers.
C. The InternationalSystem Entering the Era of Globalization
There is an ongoing debate over whether the process of globalization had
already begun at the times of the old Hetites, or in the era of the Hanseatic
League, or only after the end of World War II when the then-existing
international community of states decidedly committed itself to an allembracing liberalization of world trade. 14 Regardless of who is right in this
debate, there are good reasons to conclude that globalization has captured the
eye of a broader public only in recent decades. And it is safe to say that
globalization only became the object of extensive scholarly research during this
same period. The reasons for this rather late interest in the phenomenon of
globalization are manifold and cannot be laid out in detail in this paper. Only a
few main factors may be indicated. First, the end of the Cold War allowed an
increasing public awareness of the grave transborder problems such as dangers
to the environment, the world climate, and the worldwide migration process.
Second, the new electronic media that developed rapidly in qualitative leaps not
only widened new arenas for economic activities, but also created an
unprecedented worldwide network between economic actors, private
organizations, groups and individuals. The result of this is the now oftdescribed process of globalization of markets, politics, and law.15
Mentioning politics and law along with markets-and one should add
society-as areas impacted by globalization indicates that, according to the
position taken here, globalization cannot be understood as simply an economic
or even more restrictedly as a market phenomenon. It is a much deeper process
or set of processes that will considerably change our modes of life in various
14. See DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION 16 (1999); OTFRIED HOFFE, DEMOKRATIE IM
ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG [DEMOCRACY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION] 20 (1999).

15. See HELD ET AL., supra note 14, at 3, 5; see also Delbrck, Globalization ofLaw, supra note 1, at
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areas, particularly in the domestic political and social arenas, but also on the
international level. It is this aspect of globalization and not the rather
superficial epiphenomenon of an unfettered global capitalism that ultimately
appears to feed the uneasiness or even the angst of people with regard to
globalization.
This section will address briefly the impact of globalization on the
international system, and then deal more extensively with the influence of
globalization on the development of international law. As mentioned earlier,
globalization is understood as a process of denationalization. 16 That needs
further elaboration. First, it has to be realized that states, for quite some time
now, have withdrawn from fulfilling tasks within the domestic sphere and on
the international level that hitherto were regarded as genuinely public tasks.
Within the domestic sphere, this withdrawal from public tasks is implemented
by shifting public tasks to private actors who are not only private entities in
terms of their legal status but are also clearly part of the private sector in
substance. In part, however, the implementation of public responsibilities is
also transferred to public/private partnerships, as in the case of the privatization
of prisons.17 On the international level, the withdrawal of states from fulfilling
public tasks is implemented by transferring the "production of public goods" to
non-state entities vested with public authority, such as supranational
organizations where the Member States participate in the organizations'
decision-making process. However, the decisions taken are those of the organs
of the supranational institutions. (The reduction of direct democratic
legitimization of the exercise of public authority by these supranational
institutions that comes along with these developments can only be referred to at
this point. 18 )
Second, one has to remember that due to the revolution of
telecommunications technology, states are, to some extent, losing their steering
capacity. State control over the financial markets, and over radical right wing
or racist Internet communications that run counter to the principles and values
of rule of law and democracy-oriented societies, has become increasingly
16. For a more recent extensive discussion of the meaning of the notion of globalization, see Delbrilck,
Structural Changes,supra note 1, at 13.
17. See Alfred C. Aman, The Globalizing State: A Future Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private
Distinction,Federalism,and Democracy, 31 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769, 837 (1998).
18. For an intriguing study and analysis of the legitimacy problem based on the example of the European
Union/European Community, see ANNE PETERS, ELEMENTE EINER THEORIE DER EUROPAISCHEN
VERFASSUNG [ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION] 499 (2001).
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difficult-to put it mildly. To compensate for this loss of state control and
steering capacity, states have more and more turned to the extraterritorial
This deterritorialization of state-based
exercise of public authority.
to the further erosion of the classical model of
government, in turn, contributes
9
the territorial nation state.'
Third, another major factor in the denationalization process is that in
various contexts non-state organizations and groups are entering into areas of
political action that have been either abandoned by states or opened up through
the new opportunities of transfrontier communications. Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) like Greenpeace and Amnesty International, in taking on
the role of "self-appointed" agents of the public interest, represent a particularly
clear example of this process. It has to be added that multinational enterprises
(MNEs) have taken on a political role as actors in the transnational arena, more
than ever. As important as the work of these non-state actors in the public
sector may be, it again poses a serious problem of legitimization, as these
NGOs-not to speak of MNEs-do not have any democratically generated
mandate.2 °
What do these developments mean for the structure of the international
system? The answer is short: the monopoly of the state as a political actor in
the international system has been entirely broken. Along with states,
international governmental organizations, NGOs, MNEs, groups (e.g.
indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities) and even individuals participate in the
interactions in the international system. The question is, has international law
reacted to these developments in and of the international system, and, if so, in
what way? This question, and other legal developments not directly related to
international law but highly relevant to our subject, will be addressed in the
following section.
III. OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
UNDER THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION

The legal developments in international law that are relevant to our subject
shall be demonstrated in four areas of international law: first, the expansion of
the number of subjects of international law; second, the new modes of lawmaking and the new foundation of the binding force of international law; third,
19. For more details, see Delbrtlck, Structural Changes, supra note 1, at 31.
20. See PETERS, supra note 18.
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the changing modes and procedures of international law enforcement, and
fourth, the changing conceptualization of sovereignty.
A. New Subjects of InternationalLaw
During the early days of the second phase of the international legal
system's development, the erosion of the so-called numerus clausus of the
subjects of international law that dominated international legal doctrine up to
the end of the Nineteenth Century was already clearly visible. In the second
half of the Twentieth Century, this erosion not only continued but definitely
accelerated. Without any serious debate, supranationalorganizations such as
the European Community/European Union, which are based on international
treaties just like internationalorganizations, were recognized as subjects of
international law, i.e. they were accorded the legal capacity to act under
international law.2 ' Furthermore, with the firm establishment of the
international protection of human rights, the individual gained the statushardly contested today-of a derivative and limited subject of international law.
This is evidenced in substantive human rights law by the provision of human
rights construed as subjective individual rights, and in procedural human rights
law by the fact that individuals have standing before international human rights
courts (in Europe and in the Americas) and before international non-judicial
monitoring bodies established under several leading international human rights
conventions.2 2 There is still considerable political resistance against
recognizing certain group rights such as the right to self-determination of
national minorities or of indigenous peoples. Efforts within the United Nations
to codify the rights of indigenous peoples have made some progress but are still
far from success.

23

By contrast, the International Labor Organization did adopt

21. See OPPENHEIM, supranote 10, at 18; see also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 passim (Apr. 11) (advisory opinion ofthe International Court of Justice).
22. See, e.g., United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
Optional Protocol to the Covenant, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended by Protocol No. 11, 1994

E.T.S. No. 155; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673. On this subject, see
also OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, at 16.
23. See Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc.E/N.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add. I (1994).
For a short comment on the difficulties encountered by the UN Commission on Human rights in reaching
agreement on the Declaration, see HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALs 1301 (2d ed. 2000).

412

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 9:401

a convention on indigenous peoples in 198924 that replaced the earlier, less farreaching convention of 1957.25
According to the still dominant international legal doctrine, neither NGOs
nor MNEs possess international legal personality.26 However, in view of the
actual development of the law, such a doctrinal stance is hardly tenable
anymore and is losing support. An analysis of existing international law reveals
that in general NGOs have not become subjects of international law merely
because of their factual existence, as is the case with states. Yet, a number of
NGOs have been attributed rights directly under international treaty law. Given
the generally accepted definition of international legal personality, i.e. that it is
the capacity to possess rights and duties under international law, then
attributing rights to NGOs based on international treaties means recognizing
them as functional, derivative and limited subjects of international law. Thus,
NGOs are entitled by international human rights conventions to certain
fundamental rights (right to association, freedom of speech, procedural rights in
the sense of locus standi before international human rights courts and
monitoring bodies). Other NGOs are accorded rights of participation in the
implementation of international environmental law, as in the case of the
Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa (1994).27 These findings
do not imply that all NGOs have been recognized as-albeit limited-subjects
of international law today. What is clearly established, however, is the
principle that this legal status can be accorded to NGOs. 28 The tiring, circular
24. Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382.
25. Convention (No.107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and
Semi-tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247.
26. See generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, at 21 (hinting at such organizations being accorded some
rights on the international plane).
27. Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, particularly in Africa, 33 I.L.M. 1328(1994). For the many other instances where NGOs are
rights under primary rules (treaties) and secondary rules of international law in the implementation of
international environmental law, see SONJA RIEDINGER, DIE ROLLE NICHTSTAATLICHER ORGANISATIONEN
BEI DER ENTWICKLUNG UND DURCHSETZUNG INTERNATIONALEN UMWELTRECHTS [THE ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] 281, 254 (2001).
28. On the legal status of NGOs under primary and secondary rules of international law, see MICHAEL
HEMPEL, DIE VOLKERRECHTSSUBJEKTIVITAT INTERNATIONALER NICHTSTAATLICHER ORGANISATIONEN
[THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS] 4
passim (1999). NGOs as limited subjects of international law are also recognized by some other authors. See
IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN & GERHARD LOIBL, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN
[THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS] 84 (7th ed. 2000); OTTO KIMMINICH & STEPHAN HOBE,
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argument that international law is inter-state law, NGOs are not states, and
therefore NGOs cannot be subjects of international law has been disproved by
state practice. It must be added that NGOs have been granted substantial rights
of participation in the work of the UN Economic and Social Council under
article 71 of the UN Charter and under U.N. secondary law, i.e. the rules of
procedure of the Council and its sub-organs (observer status, rights of petition,
oral contributions). The same is true for many other international governmental
organizations. 29 Based on these developments, Hermann Mosler spoke of
NGOs as subjects of the secondary international law already in the early
1960s, 30 without any noticeable echo in the international legal community at the
time.
With regard to MNEs, one can observe that ad hoc international courts of
arbitration have in some cases recognized the international legal status of
MNEs.3 1 Yet unlike their historic predecessors (the Hanseatic League, the
English (British) and Dutch East India Companies, the Hudson Bay Company,
or the Congo Company), which at times were treated as international legal
subjects, MNEs are not generally recognized as international legal subjects.32
However, MNEs have been addressees of rules of the so-called "international
soft law" (codes of conduct) as well as decisions and resolutions by
international organizations like the UN and the OECD, particularly in the
context of the international campaign against Apartheid.33

EINFOHRUNG IN DAS VOLKERRECHT [INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW] 151 (7th ed. 2000). Some

authors are skeptical but do not rule out the possibility that NGOs could become limited subjects of
international law. See Hermann H.-K. Rechenberg, Non-governmental Organizations,in Ill ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (EPIL) 612, 617 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1997). A similar stance is
taken by KARL DOEHRING, VOLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] (1999).

29. For an overview, see Rechenberg, supra note 28.
30. See generally Hermann Mosler, Die Erweiterungdes Kreises der V61kerrechtssubjekte[The Extension

of the Number of Subjects of InternationalLaw], 22 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [ZAORV] 1 (1962). It is noteworthy that hardly any major treatise on international

law mentions NGOs, and those that do, do so without regard to the early hints at a possible change in the
structure of the international system as diagnosed by Mosler at the time. For a glaring example, see Volker
Epping, in VOLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] (Eberhard Menzel & Knut Ipsen eds., 1999) 78 (stating
"Ihnen [i.e. NGOs] kommt grundsatzlich keine V6lkerrechtssubjektivittt zu." [They (i.e. the NGOs) do not
possess international legal personality, in principle]).
31. See Peter Fischer, TransnationalEnterprises, in 4 EPEL 921, 925 (2000).

32. Id. at 923.
33. On codes of conduct, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Codes of Conduct, in I EPIL 627 (1992). See also
Jost Delbrtck, Apartheid, in UNITED NATIONS-LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE, supra note 9, at 35

(discussing UN action against apartheid involving MNEs as owners of oil tankers transporting oil to South
Africa in violations of embargos proclaimed by the United Nations).
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These findings may be interpreted to mean that there is at least a trend in
contemporary international law that this hitherto predominantly inter-state law
is transforming, in part, into a transnational legal order encompassing
international governmental organizations and non-state actors as well as states.
B. New Modes of InternationalLawmaking and the New Foundation of the
Binding Force ofInternationalLaw
1. GeneralRemarks on the Sources of InternationalLaw
Far into the Twentieth Century, the classic sources of international law
were international customary law and treaty law. As a subsidiary source, the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations-but compare article
38(l)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice-were recognized as
well. In conformity with the then-leading paradigm of sovereignty, the binding
force of these customary or treaty-based norms rested on the consent of the
states, except in the view of a few authors who based the binding force of
international law on the opinio iuris of the people or on the desire inherent in
human beings for norms regulating social relations. 34 As a consequence of this
understanding of the nature of international law, customary international law
was considered binding only in those states that did not protest against the
recognition of a rule of customary law (the controversial so-called persistent
objector principle)." Similarly, treaties were considered to be binding only
upon the parties to the treaties (the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
principle). 6
This widely accepted "pure" doctrine on the sources of international law
has never been fully consistent with state practice, particularly after World War
34. Cf GEORGE SCELLE, PRtCIS DE DROIT DES GENS 31 (1932) ("[L]a source du droit intersocial est la
meme que cell de toute autre discipline juridique: elles
est unique etse trouve dans le 'fait social'. Toute
norme sociale ou intersociale ddrive d'une contraintequi s'impose d'elle-m8me aux individus... La source
du droit international d coule des rapports intemationaux Son caract~re obligatoire d6rive de la n6cessitd des
ces rapports ...").
35. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 10 (5th ed. 1998); ALFRED
VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT-THEORIE UND PRAXIS 352 (3d ed. 1984). For
a thorough discussion of the notion of persistent objector in the context of new trends in international
lawmaking, see Jonathan Chamey, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 538-42 (1993);
Delibrck, Structural Changes, supra note 1, at 28; GRIGORu TUNKIN, THEORIE DES VOLKERRECHTS
[THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 56, 243 (Theodor Schweisfurth trans., 1972) (The former Soviet
international legal doctrine-fixed as it was on sovereignty-construed customary international law as based
on a tacit agreement.).
36. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 34-36, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341.
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I. With regard to customary international law, one can observe that since the
advent of the Twentieth Century, international legal doctrine and state practice
have increasingly modified the requirements for the formation of rules of
customary international law, i.e. the requirements for state practice to constitute
relevant state practice in this sense. Originally, a widespread practice by the
greatest number of states possible was held to be necessary. Later this
requirement was relativized to the extent that in no instance did the practice
have to be observed by all states in order to form the basis of a new rule of
customary international law. In the course of time, the requirement was
lowered even further in the sense that state practice of only some states,
including those most concerned with the subject matter of the customary rule at
issue, was considered sufficient. Only those states that expressly rejected the
new rule or protested the constitutive state practice were considered exempt
from the binding force of the new customary rule. The rest ofthe states, neither
actively involved in the relevant state practice nor commenting on the state
practice or the new rule, would be deemed to have implicitly consented.37
In the international law of treaties, the binding effect of certain categories
of treaties on states not parties to the treaties (third states) was increasingly
founded on the argument that such treaties (for instance, treaties determining
state boundaries, demilitarization, or internationalization of rivers or canals)
create an objective status or regimes that must be respected by third states.38
Thus, after World War I, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
decided in the Wimbledon Case 39 that by the internationalization of the Kiel
Canal in the Versailles Peace Treaty of 191940 an objective status had been
established that took precedence over German neutrality. In the AalandIslands
Case, the Commission of Jurists, set up by the League of Nations Council in
1919, decided that the demilitarization of the Islands provided by a treaty

37. See generallyOPPENHEIM, supranote 10, at 25-27. See also David Fidler, Challenging the Classical
Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the FutureofCustomary InternationalLaw, 39 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L.
198 (1996) for a critical analysis of the traditional doctrine on the formation of customary international law.
38. See ECKART KLEIN, STATUSVERTRAGE IMVOLKERRECHTpassim (1980); MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE
CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 37 (1997); Jost Delbrlck, "Laws in the Public
Interest"--Some Observationson the Foundationsand Identificationofergaomnes Norms in International
Law, in LIBER AMICORUM GONTHER JAENICKE-ZUM 85. GEBURTSTAG 17, 20 (Volkmar G6tz et al. eds.,
1998).
39. S.S. "Wimbledone" Case, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 1 (June 28).
40. Peace Treaty of Versailles, v. 28.6.1919 (RGBI. S.1264).

416

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 9:401

between the Great Powers Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia of 1856,41 created
an objective status established in the interest of the European Community of
States and was therefore binding on Sweden, although the latter was not a party
to the original demilitarization treaty.42
2. Lawmaking Treaties
Under the influence of the changes occurring in the international system
since the end of World War II, present state practice takes up these older, but at
the time very progressive, approaches. One of the changes in the international
system mentioned relates to the fact that the international community of states
has, in an unprecedented manner, resorted to the instrument of the multilateral
lawmaking treaty as a surrogate for central international legislative authority.
In the present context, the most important feature of these lawmaking treaties
(trait~s lois) is that they are directed toward a common goal of all parties and
that, therefore, implementation of the treaty obligations is owed by each party to
all the other parties. This, in turn, means that a violation of one of the treaty
obligations by one party vis-A-vis another party constitutes a violation of the
obligation vis-i-vis all the other parties to the treaty, regardless of whether these
other parties themselves directly suffered injuries from the violation. For
example, if one party to a multilateral human rights convention violates the
rights of its own citizens or of nationals of another state party to the convention,
all other states party to the convention are entitled to sanction the culprit state.
This intra-treaty erga omnes-effect of certain kinds of treaties constitutes a
fundamental shift of the international law of treaties toward an objective
character of international law. Additional evidence of this change in the
character of international law can be found in the jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and in the fact that, particularly after World
War II, elements of a hierarchy of norms have been introduced into
international law by through the recognition that there are fundamental norms
that are non-derogable (ius cogens). In the famous BarcelonaTractionCase of

41. See Convention, annexde au traitd de paix de Paris, Mar. 30, 1856, 15 Recueil des traitds 788. For the
Peace Treaty of Paris of 1865, see Traild general de paix I' Autriche, Mar. 30, 1856, 15 Recueil des traitds
770.
42. See Report of the International Commission of Jurists entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the task of giving an advisory opinion upon the legal aspects of the Aaland Islands Question,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3 (1920).
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1970, 43 the ICJ recognized that there are fundamental principles of international
law such that all states "have a legal interest in their protection, they are
obligations erga omnes." The Court went on to say that "[s]ome of the
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general
international law ...; others are conferred by international instruments of a
universal or quasi-universal character."" Since that time, there has been a
growing recognition that in addition to norms of general (customary)
international law, multilateral treaties for the protection of fundamental
international community interests have erga omnes-effect, i.e. they are binding
upon third states. 45 There is a consensus with regard to the existence of ius
cogens that it has erga omnes-effect, i.e. that all states are bound by these
norms whether they have consented to them or not.4 6 In summary, all of these
developments indicate that international law is moving away from the
traditional doctrine that international law is binding upon states only with their
express or implicit consent. International law is transforming into an objective
legal order.
3. The Legitimacy of International "'Legislation"
The changes in the international lawmaking process mentioned above are
important elements in the development of the concept of a world law as
discussed here. Another important development, related to lawmaking
authority, is closely related to these changes in the function, the role and the
effects of multilateral treaties as lawmaking treaties. Looking more closely at
the erga omnes-effect of such treaties protecting fundamental interests of the
international community, it becomes evident that the states participating in the
drafting and conclusion of lawmaking treaties with intended erga omnes-effect
claim for themselves the authority to create law for the international
community. That is, at least with regard to the provisions protecting
fundamental values of the international community, they claim the authority to
43. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5)
(Second Phase Judgment).
44. Id.at 33.
45. For a more detailed discussion of the ergaomnes-effect of community interest or public interest norms,
see Delbruck, supranote 38. The ergaomnes-effect of treaties protection fundamental public interests does
not mean that they become binding upon third states in full detail, but rather that third states owe the
implementation of the fundamental principles involved to the international community.
46. One consequence of the erga omnes-effect ofius cogens is that the notion of the persistent objector is
generally rejected as incompatible with the concept of ius cogens.
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create law that is binding for all. That raises the difficult problem of the
legitimization of these states to "legislate" for the international community at
large. There are two arguments to support the legitimacy of this kind of
lawmaking, one substantive and the other procedural in nature. First, the erga
omnes- or third party-effect is restricted to norms and principles that articulate
an international public interest or international community interest.4 7 In all
other cases, the pacta tertiis-principleprevails. Second, in pursuing the ideas
of Jonathan Chamey with regard to the new modes of creating international
customary law, to which we will return later, legitimization of establishing erga
omnes-norms by treaty does not require that all states participate in the drafting
and conclusion of such treaties. Instead, all states must merely have an
opportunity to participate in the lawmaking and in the necessary discourse over
48
the substantive meaning of the "public interests" to be included in the treaty.
In fact, the international community has already been following this road for
quite some time. In addition, non-state actors like NGOs have increasingly
influenced the international lawmaking process. They have employed their
expertise and by participating in the international discourse, not only within the
organs and subcommissions of international organizations but also on the
occasion of universal conferences, have thereby contributed to the legitimacy of
the erga omnes-norms elaborated by the international organizations or the
respective state conferences.49
4. Framework Conventions and InternationalizedDomestic
AdministrativeAction
Another innovation in the way international treaty law has been introduced
into state practice is the instrument of the so-called framework convention.
These multilateral conventions determine only basic principles of the intended
state conduct. The concrete obligations of the parties and the detailed
47. On the notions of the "international community interest" or "international public interest," see Bruno
Simma, From Bilateralismto Community Interest in InternationalLaw, VI RECUEIL DES COURS 229 (1994);
Jost Delbrttck, The Role of the UnitedNations in Dealing with Global Problems, 4 IND. J GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 277, 293-96 (1997); Delbralck supra note 38, at 32. On third party effect of certain treaties, see also
Christian Tomuschat, ObligationsArisingfor States without or against Their Will, 241 RDC 195 (1993).
48. See Charney, supra note 35, at 543; InternationalLawmaking-Art. 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, in
NEW TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING: INTERNATIONAL "LEGISLATION" IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
171 (Jost Delbrfick ed., 1997).
49. See RIEDINGER, supra note 27; Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Statusof
Non-governmental Organizations under InternationalLaw, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579, 590-98
(1999).
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regulations are left to the later conclusion of amending protocols or-in the
case of highly technical regulations-are delegated to expert committees or
technical institutions.5 ° The reason for this procedure is that framework
conventions, particularly in the area of international environmental law, require
a high degree of scientific expertise for the elaboration of the detailed
regulations and more often than not need to be amended because of the rapidly
changing science. Doctrinally, the amending protocols constitute treaty
amendments that frequently enter into force through a simplified procedure, i.e.
by a majority vote of the parties to the framework convention that is then
binding upon all parties, including the opposing minority, or that allow
opposing parties to exempt themselves from the protocol by opting out, albeit
within a relatively short term. 5 ' This procedure too reflects the "legislative"
character of the lawmaking process.
It is equally worth noting that the organ responsible for filling in the
framework convention with detailed regulations usually includes expert
administrators recruited from national government agencies. This leads to a
shifting of the lawmaking process to the executive branch of governments.
This, in turn, has major implications for the role of national parliaments in the
lawmaking procedure. Their role is significantly reduced.52 Since in many
cases these expert commissions also include experts from international
organizations, the result is a vertical interplay of international and domestic
administrations and an internationalization of domestic administrative
agencies.53 In sum, the delegation procedure strongly resembles the similar
procedure followed in domestic legal orders, i.e. that the legislature delegates
the detailed regulation of framework provisions of a particular statute to the
executive-another hint that international law is moving away from traditional
procedures of lawmaking.

50. For a detailed analysis of the role and function of framework conventions, see CHRISTIAN TIETJE,
INTERNATIONALISIERTES VERWALTUNGSHANDELN [INTERNATIONALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION] 247,
391 (2001).
51. See id. at 250.

52. On this aspect, see id. at 249.
53. For rich material on the vertical interplay of international and domestic administrative action in the
areas of the international protection of the environment, international administrative health law, and
international communications and transport law, see id. at 288487.
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5. CustomaryInternationalLaw
Similar developments are taking place in the creation of international
customary law. According to the traditional rules, developing international
customary norms and principles took considerable time. The requirements
were a uniform widespread state practice over a prolonged period and a
corresponding opinio iuris. The resulting slow process of establishing
customary law was increasingly considered inadequate to meet the regulatory
needs of the international community. In relatively recent times, this attitude
First, modem
towards international customary law has changed.
communications technologies allow for a much faster development of opinio
iuris. Second, a modification of the traditional sequence of steps in the
development of a new rule of customary law took place. It is not state practice
that needs to be established as a first stepfollowed by a corresponding opinio
iuris. Rather, the international community often articulates its opinio iuris,
which is then followed by a corresponding state practice. This has become
possible because the institutionalization of international cooperation within
international organizations and large universal conferences offer the platform
for states to debate extensively the substance and scope of necessary regulations
and to make their consensus public through non-binding declarations. As
Jonathan Charney has correctly observed, under certain conditions, these
declarations, as the expression of the international community's opinio iuris,
when immediately followed by state practice, can transform into binding
customary law within relatively short time. 4 An example in point is the
recognition of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) as a principle of customary
international law. The establishment of such zones was proposed during the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The proposal met
with the support of participating states. State practice followed almost
instantaneously, and certainly long before the end of the Conference and the
entering into force of the new Law of the Sea Convention that recognized
EEZs. 55 The most important factor in fostering acceptance of this short-cut to
the recognition of a new rule of international customary law-Simma speaks

54. Chatney, supra note 35.
55. See Shigeru Oda, Exclusive Economic Zones, in III EPIL 305, 306 (1995); see also RudolfBemhardt,
DerEinflufi der UN-Seerechiskonventionaufdas geltende undkiinftige internationaleSeerecht, in DAS NEUE
SEERECHT 213, 218 (Jost Delbrtlck ed., 1984).
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graphically of "instant custom" 5 6-here, again, is that all states at least have the
opportunity to participate in the articulation of the new opinio iuris. So far,
modem state practice has conformed to this requirement. Here, as well,
international lawmaking appears to take on a "legislative" character.
6. TransnationalLawmaking
In addition to international lawmaking, the development of a transnational
law, which is not a particularly new phenomenon, has become of major interest
in the context of globalization (understood as a process of denationalization of
the legal interactions in the international system between private actors).
Traditionally, interactions between private actors were regulated by domestic
law. However, private commercial actors, even on the domestic plane, felt the
need to settle their disputes before private ad hoc courts of arbitration outside
of the state judiciary. The reason was-and still is-to achieve a faster and
more practical decision in the dispute than state courts could normally
provide. 57 Particularly when the parties to a dispute are of different nationality,
they agree upon which law should be applied by the arbitral tribunal. Swiss
civil and commercial law was frequently agreed upon, but the law of the forum,
i.e. the law of the country in which the tribunal resided, and, of course, the law
of the home country of one of the parties could also be chosen to govern the
dispute. With the rising importance of MNEs, this practice appears to be
changing. 58 Arbitration is still the choice of these enterprises, for the reasons
earlier indicated. However, the norms and legal principles underlying the
decisions are left to the arbitrator to determine, and they are increasingly
derived from commercial usages and general principles of law extracted from

56. See VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 35, at 362 (rejecting the notion of "instant custom" as a selfcontradictory concept, but emphasizing that the development of customary international has greatly
accelerated because of the intensified communication among states in international organizations and other
fora).
57. See Daniel Girsberger, Entstaatlichungderfriedlichen Konflikiregelung zwischen nichtstaatlichen
Wirkungseinheiten:
Umfang
und
Grenzen-Das
Beispiel
der
internationalen
Wirtschaftsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit[Denationalizationof the Peaceful Resolution of Disputes Between Nonstate Actors: Scope and Limits-The Example of InternationalCommercial Arbitration], in 39 BERICHTE
DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FOR VOLKERRECHT [BDGVR] [REPORTS OF THE GERMAN SOCIETY OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW] 231, 233 (2000) [hereinafter BDGVR]. For an English summary, see also BDGVR,
supra,at 264-65.
58. For a discussion of the role of MNEs as lawmaking entities, see Peter T. Muchlinski, "Global
Bukowina "Examined: Viewing the MultinationalEnterpriseas a TransnationalLaw-making Community, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 79, 90-101 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
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the accumulating jurisprudence of the courts of arbitration. 59 Thus, a body of
law has developed, and is still developing, that can be called transnational
law-or, rather controversially, as a modem lex mercatoria6° that, as to its
substantive and procedural rules, is determined largely by non-state actors. A
potentially similar development is occasionally discussed with regard to the
intemet. 61 As tentative as these developments may be, they may be taken as an
indication of an emerging legal pluralism beyond the state level.62
C. InternationalLaw Enforcement
1. InternationalLaw Enforcement through JudicialProceedings
Traditionally, international law enforcement was entirely decentralized. If
the rights of an individual state had been violated, that state was dependent on
the use of certain available means of enforcement, i.e. retorsion, non-forcible
sanctions, and ultimately forcible reprisals or even waging war, in order to end
the violation of its rights and to secure damages or other satisfaction from the
63
i
culprit state. Particularly in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, the use
of ad hoc international arbitral tribunals or arbitrators gained ground as an
instrument of dispute settlement. Absent a binding international legal
obligation to resort to arbitration, this instrument of peaceful dispute settlement
could not change the decentralized character of international law enforcement,
despite a widespread use of inter-state arbitration. 64 The pro-arbitration
59. Decisions rendered in these types of arbitration are very controversially discussed under the notion of
"anational arbitration awards." See Girsberger, supranote 57, at 251.
60. See generally MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, INTERNATIONALES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL LAW] 23 (2d ed. 1995) (Whether this body of law is understood as an autonomous legal order
or whether it is ultimately based on the recognition by domestic law or international law is also a matter of

controversy: against its autonomous character it is argued that the decisions of the private international courts
need execution by domestic courts and therefore require recognition by the latter.). The counter argument is
that decisions reached by private international arbitration are increasingly implemented by the parties, the
principle of reciprocity being the incentive to abide by an adverse court ruling. Thus, enforcement by domestic
authorities is neither sought nor necessary; on the only relative importance of the question whether lex
mercatoriais an autonomous body of law. See Girsberger, supra note 57, at 255.
61. From an international conflict of law perspective on the legal aspects of the internet, see Katharina
Boele-Woelki, Internet undIPR: Wo gehtjemandins Netz? [ Where Does One Become Caughtin the Net?],
in 39 BDGVR, supra note 57, at 307, 314, 347 (hinting at a potential lex electronica). For an English
summary, see BDGVR, supra note 57, at 350.

62. For a more detailed discussion of the role and scope of transnational law and global legal pluralism, see
generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supranote 58.
63. See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-31, 519-25 (10th ed. 1989); GEORG
DAHM ET AL. I VOLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 88 (2d ed. 1989).
64. See STARKE, supra note 63, at 488-89.
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movement reached the first point of culmination when the First Hague Peace
Conference of 1899 established the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at
The Hague. However, contrary to the intentions of the protagonists of an
institutionalized procedure of dispute settlement, the PCA was and is not a
permanent court. Rather it consists of a panel of potential candidates, who
because of their expertise and personal integrity could be individually called
upon ad hoc by the parties to a dispute, through the Secretariat of the Court, to
serve as arbiter. Overall, the use of the PCA did not live up to the expectations
of its founders.6 5
With the foundation of the League of Nations and the parallel
establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), a second
major attempt at overcoming the decentralized system of international law
enforcement was undertaken. The international community pursued a kind of
double strategy: on the one hand, it was based strictly on international law,
although political dispute settlement by the League was also intended to set
limits to the unilateralism exercised in international law enforcement. On the
other hand, the concept ofjudicial settlement of disputes was to be strengthened
by setting up a permanent international court staffed with independent judges.
As adequate as this approach was from a theoretical point of view, in practice,
the implementation of this double strategy proved to be unsatisfactory. The
reasons are well known: First, the League of Nations possessed neither the
appropriate competences nor the political power to act as an efficient law
enforcement authority.6 6 Second, the PCU lacked obligatory jurisdiction and
thus was not in a position to fulfill its function as dispute settlement authority to
the extent hoped by the founding states and other nations of the world. Yet, it
cannot be overlooked that the PCIJ adjudicated a large number of cases, some
of which had a groundbreaking impact on the development of international
law.67
65. Between its establishment and the outbreak of World War II, only 20 cases were referred to the PCA;
and after World War II, only 2.

See id.

D.J. HARRIS, LL.M., PH.D., CASES AND MATERIALS ON

INTERNATIONAL LAW 911 (4th ed. 1991) reports 25 cases while MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 738
(4th ed. 1997) refers to "some twenty cases" between 1900 and 1932. It must be noted, though, that
international arbitration outside the PCA remained an important means of dispute settlement, particularly in
inter-state disputes in trade-related matters.
66. See Clive Parry, League of Nations, in m EPIL 177, 184 (pointing to the adverse political climate in the
1930s with some major states-strongly supported by their populations engaged in wars of aggression in gross
violation of the most baisc principles of international law).
67. On the record of the PCU in historical perspective, see Hans-Jorgen Schlochauer, PermanentCourtof
InternationalJustice, in Ill EPIL 988 (listing the 22 Judgments and 27 Advisory Opinions of the Court

rendered between 1923 and 1935).
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While the structural and political deficits of the League were-at least with
regard to some essential issues-avoided in the Charter of the United Nations,
the cardinal problem of an international judicial system, i.e. the source of
obligatory jurisdiction of a world court, remained unresolved. The Statute of
the new ICJ, unlike the PCIJ established as one of the principal organs of the
United Nations (art.7 UN Charter), does not provide for obligatory jurisdiction
of the court. As under the Statute of the PCIJ, only if both parties to the dispute
before the Court have voluntarily submitted to the Court's jurisdiction are they
obliged to participate in the proceedings and to accept and implement the
judgment. Because of the Cold War, litigation before the Court was not very
frequent in the early years. In recent years, however, we can observe an
increasing use of the ICJ, particularly by third-world States. The establishment
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 1996,68 the greatly
increased efficiency of the dispute settlement procedures within the Word
Trade Organization (WTO), and the establishment of an International Criminal
Court as well as of the Criminal Tribunals for the punishment of war crimes
and crimes against humanity for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, were a
welcome indication that the idea of an institutionalized judiciary as an
instrument of international law enforcement has gained momentum. In the
context of the present paper, it is of special importance that with these steps
state sovereignty is further curtailed. This is particularly true concerning the
international prosecution of state and government representatives for war
crimes and crimes against humanity based on international legal norms for the
protection of human rights and intended to sanction violations of fundamental
principles of international law. 69 The concession on the part of states in
permitting international judicial bodies directly to hold individuals responsible
for the crimes mentioned constitutes a further inroad on state sovereignty and in
a sense indicates another aspect of the denationalization process. A similar
development has taken place within some regional systems for the international
protection of human rights in that individuals are accorded standing before
international law-based human rights, courts and are entitled to bring actions
against their own or a foreign state that is party to the respective convention.7 °

68. See Stefan Talmon, ITLOS--nternationalerSeegerichtshof[InternationalTribunalforthe Law of the
Sea], Lexikon der Vereinten Nationen [Dictionaryof the United Nations] 285-94 (Helmut Volger ed., 2000).
69. For the definition of such crimes in the Statute of the ICC, see Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 LL.M. 1002.
70. See, e.g., Protocol No. 11, supra note 22, art. 34, at 5.
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2. InternationalLaw Enforcement by Coercive Measures and Cooperative
Forms of Securing Compliancewith InternationalLaw
The concept underlying the UN Charter that the Security Council should
possess a monopoly (albeit not a complete one) in applying coercive measures,
including military action, failed utterly under the conditions of the Cold War.
However, a centrally, i.e. Security Council-authorized, system of international
law enforcement in various forms has taken shape in the course of time.
Multilateral "peacekeeping operations" including the so-called "robust"
peacekeeping had a mitigating effect in many violent conflicts and helped to
curb unilateral illegal use of force.7 These successful interventions on the part
of the United Nations notwithstanding, one has to admit that in view of the rise
of ethno-nationalist conflicts in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the
organization has reached the limits of its capabilities. In particular, the broad
interpretation of the term "threat to peace" in article 39 of the UN Charter-a
necessary and logical step considering the changing nature of violent conflicts
from international to intra-state scenarios-has contributed to the dangers of an
over-commitment of the United Nations.7 2 Furthermore, although the Security
Council's reading of article 39 has widened the scope of the applicability of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it still leaves an only limited field of action for
the organization given the number of serious violations of international law that
fall below the threshold of the use of force.
Based on a critical assessment of these findings, international legal scholars
and state practice have searched for alternative non-confrontational, i.e.
cooperative, forms of international law enforcement that, by their very nature,
could be more conducive in promoting compliance than confrontational
enforcement. Such alternative cooperative forms of compliance are well known
in domestic administrative law. Thus, the government can provide incentives
for its citizens to comply with regulations or government programs, for
instance, offering tax relief or other kinds of benefits. Clashes of interests
between citizens and government agencies, particularly in local settings, can be
resolved by hammering out formal agreements in place of hierarchical orders.
It is no coincidence that these approaches to securing compliance have become
known in administrative science as "cooperative administration," as opposed to

71. See Michael Bothe, PeaceKeeping, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-A COMMENTARY

565-603 (Brunno Simma et al. eds., 1994).
72. See Delbrilck, supra note 13.
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hierarchical and ultimately repressive administration as the means of law
enforcement. From an institutional point of view, it may be problematic to
attempt to transfer such domestic approaches to the international plane. The
domestic conditions appear to be too different from those existing on the
international level. However, this reading of the cooperative compliance
strategy is too narrow and, in a sense, too state-centered. As Abram Chayes
and Antonia Handler Chayes have demonstrated impressively in their book on
"The New Sovereignty," the application of instruments used to secure
compliance cooperatively are already quite visible in international state
practice.73 A few examples of applying cooperative approaches to promoting
compliance with treaty obligations that are most similar to the domestic
approaches may be mentioned here. First, there are examples of seeking
compliance by providing incentives to abide by treaty commitments. Thus, in
order to induce compliance by all the parties to a treaty for the protection of the
environment, they stipulate mutual benefits in their trade relations that could be
withheld from a party not abiding by its treaty obligations. More important
than this, to some extent still repressive approach, are agreements that are based
on the principle of solidarity, i.e. on the commitment to mutual assistance in the
implementation of the treaty. Non-compliance with environmental treaties
often results from the fact that particularly developing countries do not possess
the technical and financial resources to implement their obligations under the
treaty. The cooperative approach to compliance aims at the provision of
assistance by the stronger parties to the treaty to those less able. This assistance
may consist of financial or technological and scientific aid, for example, for
data collection and their assessment.
In addition, states parties to a particular treaty have resorted to
institutionalizing their close cooperation by establishing a comprehensive
monitoring system that would allow them more easily to reach consensus on the
necessary environmental protection measure and on the standards of protection
to be achieved. In the present context, it is important to note that in both of
these approaches to cooperative compliance, non-state actors, namely NGOs,
play an essential role. They become involved in practical implementation of
protective measures where necessary (for instance, by educating the local
people through persons they know and can trust). Another important function
of NGOs is that they are usually well informed of the internal conditions of all
73. On this aspect and the following considerations, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY---COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
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parties to the treaty in question, allowing them to exercise valuable monitoring
functions. They are able to inform the public of treaty violations at any time
and thus exercise political pressure to induce compliance. As in the case of the
protection of human rights, the NGOs fulfill a public task that was traditionally
looked after by the governments. Here, too, we observe an interconnection of
state and non-state implementation of public tasks similar to that discussed with
regard to the fulfillment of public tasks upon transfer of those tasks to
74
supranational authorities.
D. The Changing Conceptualizationof Sovereignty
Correctly understood, sovereignty as a principle of international law has
never been absolute, but relative in the sense that the sovereignty of one state
found its legal limits in the sovereignty of the other states. The rather oddly
phrased article 2 (1) of the UN Charter, 75 speaking of the "sovereign equality"
of the Member States, codifies this correct understanding of the concept of
sovereignty. Despite its legal relativity-as discussed above M-it
was
understood as embodying the supreme power, and therefore international legal
obligations had to be interpreted according to the motto "in dubiopro suprema
potestate" (in case of doubt in favor of the supreme power). In other words,
one could say that in the classical international system and its legal order the
dogma was that there could be no state without sovereignty. However, this
dogma was doctrinally overcome by Georg Jellinek about a century ago. 7 In
the course of his famous "Allgemeine Staatslehre" (Theory of the State), he
came to the conclusion-far ahead of his time-that sovereignty was not the
essence of statehood, but rather an accidental attribute of the supreme power of
the state. Thus, statehood without sovereignty became a thinkable concept.
Under the influence of this new conceptualization of sovereignty, the various
changes in the status of the state as a subject of international law-as they were
depicted in the preceding parts of the paper--could take place: the integration
of states into the ever-tightening network of international organizations. This is
also marked by the continuing retreat of the state from the fulfillment of
74. See supra Part 1.2.
75. The phrase is odd in the sense that "equality" as an abstract notion cannot be sovereign in any real

sense of the word. But it does indicate that all states are legally equal, otherwise they could not be sovereign
in the legal sense. Sovereignty and equality are two sides of the same coin.
76. See supra Part .1.
77. See GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE [GENERAL THEORY OF THE STATE] 262, 740 (3d
ed. 1914); HOBE, supra note 11,at 64.
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hitherto genuinely state tasks-without any doubts being raised as to the
continuing capacity of state to act under international law and thus retain the
status of a subject of international law. Recent attempts in the international
legal literature to declare incompatible with state sovereignty, and therefore
illegal, the binding decisions of the UN Security Council authorizing
enforcement measures under Chapter VII, are methodologically flawed and
simply false. Under existing international law, the UN Member States, by
virtue of their acceptance of the UN Charter, have agreed to the ensuing
restrictions on their sovereignty. 78 Sovereignty in the understanding of the
critics is borrowed from past times, but unfortunately, there are occasional
lapses into the past in state practice today. However, certain kinds of unilateral
actions, namely the use of force, have increasingly met with severe criticism in
the international community as, for example, the Soviet Union experienced
after the invasion of Afghanistan in 197979 and the United States after the air
raids on Libya in 198680 and on Sudan/Afghanistan in 1998.81 Unilateralism
below the threshold of the use of force has also been openly criticized, such as
the renunciation of the ABM Treaty by the United States in 2001 .82 Reactions
to this kind of old style sovereignty oriented policies pursued in an alleged
"national interest" have become increasingly bold. Thus, the United States, for
the first time, lost its seat on the Human Rights Commission established under
the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2001,83 and the Durban
Conference against Racism of 2001 resisted intense pressure by the United
States to replace language offensive to the United States in the final conference
document.84 Whether the U.S. position in these matters was justified is
immaterial at this point. The important aspect of these reactions on the part of a
large segment of the international community is that international or rather
global leadership cannot be successfully and credibly exercised unless in a
cooperative and, at the same time, rule of law-based spirit. States will continue
to play an important and even dominant role in the international system.
78. The concept of sovereignty with which the UN actions are supposed to be incompatible is an
extraneous notion revived from pre-World War I times, not the concept on which the UN are based according
to article 2(1) of the Charter.
79. On this forcible intervention, see 50 Archiv der Gegenwart [AdG], 23395 A (1980).
80. See 56 AdG, 29797 A (1986).
81. See 68 AdG, 42976 A (1998).
82. David E. Sanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. to Pull Out ofABM Treaty, ClearingPathforAntimissile
Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at AI.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Nevertheless, their sovereignty-if one wants to hold on to the notion (and
there are good reasons to do so)-has to be re-conceptualized. In the future, a
"new sovereignty" is at issue, one that is formed by the paradigms of
cooperation and compliance with the international legal order. In the words of
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes: "[o]ur argument goes further. It
is that for all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty no longer consists in
thefreedom ofstates to act independently, in theirperceivedself-interest,but in
membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the
substance of international life."85 Leadership through representing a role model
informed by the values of peace, cooperation and compliance with principles
and rules of international law is the order of the day in the era of globalization.
IV. TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON THE POTENTIAL STRUCTURE OF A

"WORLD LAW"

In conclusion, the theoretical structure and substance of a potential "world
law" will be sketched out based on the preceding analysis.
1. It can be shown that the globalizing international system increasingly
presents itself as a multilevel system in which public tasks are implemented
partly in horizontal cooperation and partly by vertically interconnected state and
non-state actors.
2. One of the tasks to be performed within the multilevel system is the
development of a legal order that transcends both traditional classical
international law in scope and the inter-state law of cooperation as it has
emerged since the end of World War I. The new legal order encompasses
existing international law, but transforms such that it also extends to non-state
actors. These become limited functional subjects of international law as
needed. Under the influence of these new subjects of international law,
international law itself also transforms in substance in that it becomes more
focused on the protection of fundamental international community or
international public interests.
3. In the course of this transformation process, international law
increasingly develops into an objective legal order. Its binding force is
becoming less dependent on the actual consent of states. Rather it takes on a
"legislative" character and thereby becomes binding also on those states (and
other actors) that did not consent to the recognition of certain rules for the
85. CRAYES & CiAYES,supra note 73, at 27 (emphasis added).
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protection of international community interests (erga omnes effect of public
interest norms). The legitimacy of such law rests on the fact that it results from
a public discourse in various universal fora open to all states. Furthermore, it is
essential for the legitimacy of such "legislated" international law that non-state
actors participate in the public discourse preceding the adoption of public
interest norms. Similar requirements apply to the accelerated creation of rules
of international customary law that articulate public interests.
4. The new international legal order is complemented by the relatively
autonomous development of legal regimes by non-state actors, i.e. by
lawmaking beyond the state ("law without a state"). Thereby a pluralistic legal
order develops that consists of the existing law, the partially transformed
international law, and the (relatively) autonomous body of (transnational) law.
5. In order to ensure the necessary coherence of this comprehensive legal
order, and particularly to preserve those fundamental principles of the rule of
law that were hard fought for in previous centuries, there is a need for basic
constitutional norms that serve as the integrating foundation of the composite
new legal order. Contemporary international law has entered into a process of
constitutionalization,86 evidenced for instance by the increasing hierarchization
of international law (ius cogens, erga omnes norms).
6. We may call the comprehensive legal order sketched out here a "world
law." This legal order is increasingly characterized by a centralizing law
enforcement. This is indicated by the strengthening of the international
judiciary and the pursuance of strategies aiming at achieving compliance with
international law by offering incentives and providing for effective compliance
control by non-state actors; in other words, compliance is intended to rely more
on cooperative approaches than on repressive or confrontational measures.
CONCLUSION

To "realists" the preceding consideration may be pure fiction; for
traditional international lawyers, some of the observations may be disquieting.
One can answer the realists by noting that the structural changes in the
international system can be empirically verified. It appears to be unrealistic and
even dangerous to close one's eyes to these changes. To the traditional
international lawyers the answer is: the envisaged "world law" will not replace
86. See Jochen A. Frowein, Konstitutionalisierung
des V6lkerrechts [Constitutionalizationoflnternational

Law], 39 BDGVR, supranote 57, at 427.
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existing international law, and states will remain the most important actors in
the international system. However, their sovereignty will be transformed into a
"new sovereignty." The function of a "world law" is to provide the framework
for the emerging international or global civil society under law. Without the
success of the vision of a global civil society under law, the great opportunities
of globalization would be lost and it would become what its critics have said all
along: nothing but capitalism let loose. It is the responsibility of international
lawyers, among many others, to promote the cause of a global rule of law.

